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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ABSTRACTS
Procedure--Upward Revision of Verdict and New Trial on
Issue of Damages Alone
D's automobile struck and fatally injured a six-year-old child
crossing the highway. A wrongful death action was brought against
D in the federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction.
The major issue was whether "the child had entered the highway
so suddenly that the defendant could not stop or otherwise avoid
the injury." The child could not be guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. Judgment was entered for P on a verdict
for $5,000. P moved for a new trial nisi on the ground of inade-
quacy of the verdict and alternatively for a new trial on the
issue of damages. Held, motions denied. The federal court could
not, under the federal constitution, increase the jury award. A
new trial would not be granted on the issue of damages alone
when the verdict, although inadequate and possibly a compro-
mise, was not insubstantial and when there was no obvious mis-
conduct by the jurors. Barton v. Griffith, 253 F. Supp. 774 (D.S.C.
1966).
The federal court's rejection of the request for an upward re-
vision of the verdict was based on the decision in Dimick v.
Schiedt.' In that case, the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, determined that a federal court is without power to
increase the amount of damages awarded by the jury. To allow
such an increase would be to infringe the right of jury trial granted
by the seventh amendment. On the other hand, remittiturs, or
downward revisions of verdicts, were found acceptable in the
Dimick case. The Court, however, did suggest that it would have
ruled against the use of remittiturs in federal courts if the device
had not been so well established.
Since the Dimick decision has been interpreted as having ap-
plication only to federal courts, some state courts have adopted
the use of additurs.2 However, its use has been limited in most
instances to cases involving liquidated damages.3 State courts have
1293 U.S. 474 (1935).
2See WRiGir, FEDR AL Cour's § 92, at 350 (1963); Annot., 56
A.L.R.2d 213 (1957).
' See e.g., Fall v. Tucker, 113 Kan. 713, 216 Pac. 283 (1923).
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allowed remittiturs more frequently than additurs. These down-
ward revisions are generally allowed even if the damages are
unliquidated.' However, in several states, including West Virginia,
remittiturs are granted only when the amount of damages is
measurable by a definite standard.'
The court in the principal case, referring to the obvious inade-
quacy of the verdict and the close question of liability, concluded
that the jury's decision may have been a compromise. A compro-
mise verdict occurs when the jurors cannot agree on the issue of
liability and a verdict is reached by some jurors surrendering their
convictions on one issue in return for concessions by other jurors
on another issue.6 Ordinarily this is cause for a new trial on all
issues because such an occurrence taints the entire decision.' West
Virginia is among the jurisdictions adhering to this view.8 This
concept is actually a corollary to the general rule that if the issue
of damages cannot be severed from other issues in the case, a
new trial on all issues should be granted." A new trial absolute
was not granted in the principal case because a request for such
a trial was not made by the plaintiff and the court would not
order a new trial on its own motion in the absence of obvious mis-
conduct of the jurors.
Whether a West Virginia plaintiff faced with an inadequate
verdict as in the principal case could successfully request an
additur is doubtful since no reported decisions of the West Virginia
Supreme Court have considered the propriety of additur. He may
be able to accomplish the same result by moving for a new trial
on the amount of damages alone if the verdict is so small as to
indicate that the jury was influenced by improper motives or a
mistake concerning the applicable law."0 However, in a case in
which the verdict is the result of an improper compromise of
non-severable issues of liability or a mistaken view of the case,
4 Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L. REv. 1, at 5 (1942).
5 Id. at 29.6 fHigh v. Lenow, 195 Tenn. 158, 258 S.W.2d 742 (1953).
7 Jenkins v. Gerber, 336 IlM. App. 469, 84 N.E.2d 699 (1949).
8 Munden v. Johnson, 102 W. Va. 735, 135 S.E. 832 (1926). See also
Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 135 W. Va. 594, 64 S.E.2d 606 (1951)
(quotient verdict).
9 Rawle v. Mcllhenny, 163 Va. 735, 177 S.E. 214 (1934).
1 0 W. VA. R. Cry. P. 59(a); Richmond v. Campbell, 148 W. Va. 595,
136 S.E.2d 877 (1964)- of. Stone v. United Fuel Gas Co., 111 W. Va. 569,
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the new trial must be on all the issues. The reluctance of courts
to substitute their judgment for that of the jury is obviously
motivated by a recognition that, even though a more liberal prac-
tice would accomplish uniformity, it would make the right to
jury trial in civil cases practically meaningless.
Torts--West Virginia's Privity Requirement for Products Liability
P's arm was amputated when caught in a harvesting machine
manufactured by D. P contended that D negligently constructed
and designed the harvester. D asserted that F, an employee of
the purchaser, could not maintain an action since no privity of
contract existed between P and D. Held, judgment for D. The
negligence of D was not established. However, the absence of
privity would have been no bar to liability if negligence had been
shown, even though the harvester was not inherently or im-
minently dangerous. Shanklin v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 254 F.
Supp. 223 (S.D. W. Va. 1966).
The doctrine of privity of contract arose in the middle nine-
teenth century in order to afford manufacturers and merchants
protection against excessive liability. The court in Winterbottom
v. Wright stated, by dictum, that privity of contract is required
in a negligence action against a manufacturer or seller of a product
alleged to have caused injury.' Consequently, the original seller
was not liable for any damages caused except to the immediate
buyer.
The fate of the Winterbottom decision, however, was not ex-
pansion but rather extensive limitation. Thus, a seller became
liable to third parties injured through the use of a product when
he failed to inform the buyer that the product was dangerous for
its intended purpose.2 However, the most important limitation
on the privity requirement was effected by imposing liability on
a seller for the sale of an article "imminently" or "inherently"
dangerous.' This included a wide range of products, such as
explosives and products intended for human consumption.4 The
10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
'Shubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892).
3 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 445 (1852).4 PRossm, ToRTs § 96, at 660 (3d ed. 1964).
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exact definition of "inherently dangerous" remained obscure until
the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' The effect
of this decision was to impose on a manufacturer a duty of reason-
able care toward the original consumer who might foreseeably be
injured as a result of the distribution of goods negligently manu-
factured. MacPherson met with widespread acceptance and has
been extended to such a degree that it may be concluded that
the duty of the manufacturer extends to all persons who might
reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the product in its
probable use.6 Phrasing the duty of the manufacturer in these
terms has the effect of abolishing privity completely when negli-
gence is the theory of recovery. This effect has been achieved
by a Virginia statute which provides that privity is no defense if
the "plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might
reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods"
7
The West Virginia court, however, has not made a final disposi-
tion on the question of privity. The court has allowed exceptions
for articles intended for internal consumption,8 and for products
dangerous if defectively made,9 but the necessity of an "inherently"
dangerous instrumentality has not been expressly repudiated.
The principal case refers to the case of Williams v. Chrysler
Corp."0 as the latest case touching upon the privity question in
West Virginia. In this instance, the lower court stated that "it
seems to be well settled in West Virginia that the manufacturer
is liable only where the product is inherently dangerous."" The
West Virginia court did not settle this issue, but instead decided
the case on a disclaimer provision, stating that the express war-
ranty between the plaintiff and the defendant precluded the plain-
tiff from maintaining the action. The court's consideration of the
implied warranty provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, now a part
of the Uniform Commercial Code in West Virginia, might be
interpreted as suggesting a different result had the Code been
operative in West Virginia at the time the cause of action arose.
5217 N.Y. 382, 11 N.E. 1050 (1916). -
6 PaossE, op. Cit. supa note 4, at 662-63.
7
VA. CODE § 8.2-318(1965).
' Webb v. Brown & Wiliamson Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d
898 9 o v. Johnson, 139 W. Va. 607, 80 S.E.2d 857 (1954).
10 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964).
11 Id. at 657, 137 S.E.2d at 227.
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Such an interpretation has no apparent foundation since the Code
is "consciously neutral" 2 on the issue of the manufacturer's liability
to the consumer.
In Shanklin, the court suggested that the reasoning in the Wil-
liams case might have been "somewhat misguided" and contrary
to the "spirited trend toward disregarding privity." Nevertheless,
the court concluded that if this case were presented to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals at this time, it would "adopt the
modem view by holding that such a showing [of privity] is not a
requirement for maintenance of the action." This statement was
dicta because no negligence was found. Of course, the "Erie-
educated guess" of a federal district court, in any event, is not a
binding interpretation of law. 3 Therefore, whether the West
Virginia court will abandon the privity requirement in this kind of
case is doubtful.
Wils-Divorce and Property Settlement as Implied
Revocation of Will
Decedents will devised all of his estate to his wife, the appellee.
Subsequently he and his wife were divorced and a property settle-
ment was executed. On the death of her husband, the appellee
offered the will for probate. Appellant, a surviving brother of
the decedent and one of several heirs at law, filed a caveat.
Appellee was awarded a directed verdict giving the will effect.
Held, reversed. The combination of the divorce and property
settlement had the function of revoking the will by implication of
law. Luff v. Luff, 359 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
At common law the doctrine of implied revocation of a will
was invoked upon a woman's marriage and upon a man's marriage
and the subsequent birth of issue.' This doctrine has been ex-
panded in most jurisdictions by judicial interpretation and statu-
tory enactment. In this process of expansion, some courts have
adopted the view that a divorce coupled with a property settlement
2 Lorensen, Product Liability and Disclaimers in West Virginia, 67
W. VA. L. REv. 291 (1965).13 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1 ATmIsoN, Wn.is § 85 (2d ed. 1952); e.g., Mosely v. Mosely, 217
Ark. 536, 231 S.W.2d 99 (1950).
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impliedly revokes a will.2 However, this extension of the doctrine
has not been accepted in all jurisdictions.
The divergent viewpoints are greatly attributable to differ-
ences in applicable statutes. In instances where the statute speci-
fies that a will is impliedly revoked by a change of conditions or
circumstances, the majority of courts have held that the will is
revoked, the rationale being that divorce and a property settlement
is a sufficient change of circumstances to satisfy the statute.'
However, if the statute is silent in this regard, the weight of
authority is to the contrary.4
The court in the instant case found that a revocation by implica-
tion occurred even though the applicable statute provided express
methods of revocation which did not include revocation by change
of circumstances or conditions.' Taking the view that implied
revocation is applicable to situations occurring at common law
as well as to those situations "within the rationale of the doctrine
due to historical change," the court seems to be attempting judicial
expansion of the statute by reading the common law doctrine into
the statute and expanding the doctrine to meet more modem
situations.
It is to be noted that the applicable statute in the principal
case is similar to the West Virginia statute on revocation.6 The
similitude involved relates to the enumeration of express means of
revocation without mention of implied revocation by change of
conditions or circumstances. In construing the statute, however,
the West Virginia court has reached a different result. The court,
in Swanm v. Swann," held that "implied revocation is precluded as
a recognized principle by the express language of our applicable
statute."8 Thus, the West Virginia court appears to follow the
doctrine of "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius"-the inclusion of
2 Caswell v. Kent, 158 Me. 493, 186 A.2d 581 (1962). It is to be noted
that generally a divorce alone, in the absence of a statute to the contrary,
will not effect this result. Davis v. Davis, 57 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1952).
352 HAuv. L. REV. 332 (1938); e.g., Pardee v. Grubess, 34 Ohio App.
474, 171 N.E. 375 (1929); Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N.W. 699
(1893).
452 HAuv. L. REv., supra note 3; e.g., Matter of the Estate of Robinson,
64 Cal. App. 643, 222 Pac. 374 (1923); Pacetti v. Rowlinski, 169 Ga. 602,
150 S.E. 910 (1929).
5 D.C. Code Ann. § 19-103 (1961).6 W. VA. CODE ch. 41, art. 1, § 7 (Michie 1966).7 Swann v. Swann, 131 W. Va. 555, 48 S.E.2d 425 (1948).
8 Swarm v. Swann, supra at 559, 48 S.E.2d at 428.
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one is the exclusion of the other. Therefore, it would seem
doubtful that the West Virginia court will in the future incorpor-
ate any extension of the common law doctrine of implied revoca-
tion into the statute on revocation.
Edward Perry Johnson
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